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Matthews: Constitutional Law: Speak Freely in California Shopping Centers

CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SPEAK FREELY IN
CALIFORNIA SHOPPING CENTERS
PruneYard Shopping Centerv. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980)
Students distributed pamphlets and circulated petitions' in the courtyard
of a large California shopping center. 2 A security guard enforcing the shopping
center's policy against expressive activity told the students to leave the premises. 3
The students left and subsequently sought an injunction from a California
superior court to restrain the shopping center from excluding them. 4 Finding
the students' activity unprotected by the federal or California constitutions both
because the property was private and an alternate forum was available, the
court denied the injunction.5 The California Court of Appeal affirmed.6 Reversing the lower courts, the California Supreme Court found the state constitution 7 protects a reasonable expressive activity on shopping center property.8
*Editor's Note: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the outstanding case comment submitted by a Junior Candidate in the Summer 1980 Quarter.
1. 100 S. Ct. 2035, 2038 (1980). The students, members of the 1976 confirmation class of
Temple Emanu-El in San Jose, California, wished to send petitions to the President of the
United States and members of Congress. The petitions concerned the students' grievances
about the persecution of Jews in Syria and a United Nations resolution labelling Zionism as a
form of racism. Brief for Appellee at 6, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035
(1980).
2. 100 S. Ct. at 2038. PruneYard Shopping Center includes 65 shops, 10 restaurants and a
movie theater. The privately owned center covers approximately 21 acres - five used for
parking and 16 covered by walkways, plazas and the buildings. The center, owned by Fred
Sahidi, is open to the public for commercial purposes. Id.
3. Id. The center's policy prohibited all visitors and tenants from engaging in any publicly
expressive activity, including the circulation of petitions unless the activity was related to the
center's commercial purposes. The policy was strictly and non-discriminately enforced. The
guard suggested they move to the public sidewalk that bordered the shopping center. Id.
PruneYard has public sidewalks and streets on two sides, the other sides are bordered by
private property. Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 902 n.l, 592 P.2d, 341,
342 n.1, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 855 n.1 (1979), afJ'd, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
4. The injunction was sought in the California Superior Court of Santa Clara County.
100 S.Ct. at 2038.
5. Jurisdictional Statement at A-2, A-3, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S. Ct.

2035 (1980).
6. Jurisdictional Statement B-1, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035

(1980).
7. "Every person may freely speak, write, and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty
of speech or press." CAL. CONsT. art. I, §2. "(P)eople have the right to ... petition government
for redress of grievances." Id. §3.
8. Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854
(1979), aff'd, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980). The court determined that the holding in Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) in which the Supreme Court held that the first amendment did
not protect speech in privately-owned shopping centers, did not preclude the California con-
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed 9 and HELD, a state may limito a

shopping center owner's right to exclude a free expression as long as the restriction does not amount to a taking of the owner's property without just
compensation.-1
Constitutionally protected property rights have never been reduced to a

simple definition. 12 The Supreme Court has recognized a "bundle of rights"which is protected from state and federal governments14 and from other indi-

viduals.'r The right to exclude has been defined as one right in that bundle.1 6
The Supreme Court has found that an owner has a fundamental right to ex-

clude others from private property.' 7 There have been conflicting decisions,
however, concerning the owner's right to exclude when he opens his property
for use by the public.'8
stitution from protecting such activity. 23 Cal. 3d at 904-05, 592 P.2d at 344-45, 153 Cal. Rptr.
at 856-57. The court found the California constitution's protection of speech and petition to
be a justifiable reason to restrict private property rights. Id. at 908-11, 592 P.2d at 346-48, 153
Cal. Rptr. at 859-61.
9. 100 S. Ct. at 2044. The Court found its jurisdiction to be proper under 28 U.S.C.
§1257(2) (1976) because state constitutions are "statutes" within the meaning of that section.
100 S. Ct. at 2037. 28 U.S.C. §1257 (1976) provides: "Final judgments or decrees rendered by
the highest court of a State in which decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court as follows: .. . (2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of
any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity."
10. 100 S. Ct. at 2036. The Court noted that a state may restrict property rights as an
exercise of its police power promoting public health, safety or welfare. See Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390-95 (1926).
11. 100 S. Ct. at 2040-41. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.: "(N)or shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." This "taking clause" has been made binding on the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
12. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945) (a person's relationship with the physical thing was what the takings clause protects).
13. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 100 S.Ct. 318 (1979) (only one right from bundle destroyed,
does not constitute a taking).
14. See note 11 supra.
15. The "bundle of rights" includes "the right to use and control the property, to exclude
others from the use of it, and to sue to regain possession from one who has taken it without
permission or to obtain damages from one who has injured it." United States v. Lutz, 295 F.2d
736, 740 (5th Cir. 1961). It also includes "the right to possess and transport their property,
and to donate or devise [it]." Andrus v. Allard, 100 S.Ct. 318, 327 (1979).
16. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 100 S.Ct. 383, 393 (1979) ("universally held to
be a fundamental element of the property right").
17. See id. at 392-93, citing International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250
(1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But cf. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)
(municipal ordinance may not ban door to door canvasing for a religion in private residential
area).
18. Cases holding that an owner may exclude usually rest on the absence of any right on
the part of the party wishing to enter. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 100 S.Ct. 383
(1979) (owner of a privately developed marina may exclude non-paying members of the
public); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (shopping center owners may exclude
those wishing to engage in expressive activity).
Owners who open their property for use by others may not be allowed to exclude those
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In Marsh v. Alabama,19 the Supreme Court examined the right of a company owning a town to exclude a woman distributing religious pamphlets by
enforcing criminal trespass charges.20 The Court found the property, a companytown, had all of the characteristics of a municipality.21 Reasoning that if the
property were state-owned the woman's expressive activity would be protected
by the first amendment, the Court found no reason to allow her exclusion from
property which was functionally equivalent to a town.2 2 The title to the seemingly public property being held by a private company did not justify interference with first amendment rights.23 When the majority balanced the property owner's rights against the freedom of speech and religion, the latter occupied a preferred position. 24 The Court observed that by opening his property
to use by the public, an owner subjects his property to limitations imposed by
25
the statutory and constitutional rights of others.
Several state courts extended the Marsh functional equivalence test from
company-towns to shopping centers.26, Those courts treated the privately owned
with protected riglits. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 261
(1964) (motel owners may not discriminate on basis of race due to public accommodations
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956)
(employers may not exclude union organizers who have no reasonable alternative to reach
employees).
19. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
20. Id. at 502. The woman was warned to leave the property, but she refused. She was
charged with violating the state statute prohibiting persons from entering or remaining on
the property of another after having been warned not to do so. Id. at 503-04.
21. Id. at 503, 507-08. The property, known as Chickasaw, Alabama, included residential
buildings, streets, a sewage system with a disposal plant, and a business district. Access to the
business block required travel on company-owned streets and sidewalks which were indistinguishable from the surrounding publicly-owned property. The policeman was a deputy of
the county but he was paid by the company. Id. at 502-03.
22. Id. at 504. Traditionally, publicly-owned streets and parks are known as public forums
where first amendment rights are protected. See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 808 U.S. 147,
162 (1989) (public streets must be open for pamphleteering regardless of the litter); Hague v.
CIO, 807 U.S. 496, 513-16 (1989) (organizations must be allowed to use streets and parks for
open meetings, regulated only for peace and order). But cf. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828,
838-40 (1976) (military regulation prohibiting protesters on Army post does not violate first
amendment); Adderly v. Florida, 885 U.S. 89, 47-48 (1966) (state may prohibit demonstrations
outside a jail without violating the first amendment because of the nature of the state's use
of the property).
23. 826 U.S. at 505. The first amendment only protects an individual's rights of free speech
and religion from interference by the federal government. Interference by a state is prohibited
by the first amendment applied through the fourteenth amendment due process clause. An
individual's rights are not protected from interference unless the government is involved some
way, usually called simply "state action." In Marsh this involvement was found by the creation of the "functional equivalence" doctrine which held that the state had delegated its
powers to the owner by allowing his property to function as the equivalent to a municipality.
Therefore, the first amendment would limit the owner's property rights. Id. at 508-09.
24. Id. at 509.
25. Id. at 506. "Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner,
for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his
rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it." Id.
26. See, e.g., Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionary Workers Local 81,
61 Cal. 2d 766, 984 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1964) (union picketers allowed in shopping
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property as if it were public to prohibit owners from excluding those wishing
to exercise first amendment rights. The Supreme Court in Food Employees
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.27 aifirmed the extension of the Marsh
rationale, holding that a shopping center could not exclude union picketers
from protesting on the property of a non-union store located in a shopping
mall. 25 Finding the shopping center to be the functional equivalent29 of a
public business district, the Court determined that the picketers' first amendment rights were violated by an injunction prohibiting their expressive activity.30 The Court limited the right to engage in expressive activity on shopping center property to situations where the protesters' message was related to
the shopping center, and there was no adequate public forum from which the
protesters could reach their intended audience.31 The issue of an owner's right
to exclude expressive activity which is unrelated to his property was expressly
32
reserved by the Court.
Courts split in deciding shopping center cases after Logan Valley. Some
distinguished Logan Valley in order to allow exclusion by shopping center
owners 33 while others stretched it farther than its expressedlimits by allowing
center), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Wonderland
Shopping Center, Inc., 370 Mich. 547, 122 N.W.2d 785 (1963) (affirmed injunction forbidding
shopping center from interfering with union handbillers); Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store
Employees Local 144, 16 Wis. 2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876 (1962) ("open for public use" doctrine
requires allowance of picketing). Contra, People v. Goduto, 21 Ill. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385 (no
constitutional protection for distributing leaflets in customer parking lot of single store), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961); South Discount Foods, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 1552, 14
Ohio Misc. 188, 235 N.E.2d 143 (1968) (shopping center only open for potential customers'
use and is not public property).
27. 891 U.S. 308 (1968). See generally Note, The Right to Picket on a Privately Owned
Shopping Center, 73 DicK. L. Rav. 519 (1969); Comment, Free Speech: Peaceful Picketing on
Quasi-PublicProperty, 53 MINN. L. Rav. 873 (1969).
28. 891 U.S. at 325. The union members, employees of other grocery stores, protested because the new store, Weis Markets, Inc., had a wholly non-union staff. After Weis and Logan
received an injunction against the protesters, they continued their picketing on berms along
the public roads leading to the center. They passed out handbills asking the public not to
patronize Weis Market. Id. at 311-12.
29. Id. at 318.
30. Id. at 319. The Court said the first amendment activity must be consonant with the
use to which the property is put. Id. at 320.
The Court allowed the property owners to make reasonable regulations on the expressive
activity to prevent too much interference with the businesses. Id. See Comment, Picketing of
the Modern Market Place: The Rights of Ownership and Free Speech, 48 B.U.L. REV. 699,

702 (1968).
31. 391 U.S. 308, 320 n.9 (1968).
32. Id. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Black noted that the picketers were interfering
with the business by picketing in the pick-up zone and on the covered porch. Id. at 327.
Justice Black expressed the view that the Court had "taken" Weis' property by giving it to
the pickets and should have awarded him just compensation. Id. at 330. Justice Black, author
of the opinion in Marsh, felt that decision should be limited to the unusual situation of a
company-owned town. Id. at 330-32.
33. See, e.g., Broadmoor Plaza, Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 21 Ohio Misc. 245, 257
N.E.2d 420 (1969) (enjoined picketing at a shopping center to prevent violence). See generally
Comment, The Shopping Center: Quasi-PublicForum for Suburbia 6 U.S.F.L. RV. 103 (1971).
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expressive activity which was unrelated to the property.34 The differences were
resolved by the Supreme Court's decision in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,35 ending
the trend of favoring individuals' first amendment rights over property rights.
Owners of a large shopping center sought reversal of a federal court order
enjoining the center from interference with anti-war handbilling on its premises. 36 In rejecting the lower courts' reliance on Marsh and Logan Valley, the
Lloyd Court stated the functional equivalence language had not been determinative in Logan Valley.37 The Lloyd majority refused to use the functional
equivalence doctrine and held the shopping center was private property where
38
first amendment rights would not apply.
The Lloyd Court distinguished Logan Valley on two bases. First it noted
the absence of a relationship between the handbillers' message and the Lloyd
Center.3 9 Second the justices concluded there were adequate alternative forums
available in Lloyd. 40 The Court expressed concern that a decision allowing unrelated first amendment activity in shopping centers would apply to small retail

34. See, e.g., Wolen v. Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968) (anti-war
protesters allowed to express protest in terminal); Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 653, 477 P.2d 733,
91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970) (petitioners may seek signatures in a shopping center), retvd as inconsistentwith Lloyd, 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1974), overruled, Robins
v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979); State
v. Miller, 280 Minn. 566, 159 N.W.2d 895 (1968) (shopping center could not prohibit campaign pamphlet distribution); Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping Center, Inc., 3 Wash. App.
833, 478 P.2d 792 (1970) (shopping center will be treated as business district for initiative
petition). See generally Comment, The Exercise of First Amendment Rights in Privately Owned
Shopping Centers, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 427.
35. 407 U.S. 551 (1972). See generally Henely, Property Rights and First Amendment
Rights: Balance and Conflict, 62 A.B.A.J. 77 (1976); Comment, Constitutional Law: Shopping
Center Not open to First Amendment Activities Unrelated to Use, 57 MINN. L. REv. 603 (1973).
86. Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 308 F. Supp. 128 (D. Or. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.
1971). revid, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
37. 407 U.S. 551, 563 (1972). The Court quoted from Justice Black's dissent in Logan
Valley explaining the limits of functional equivalence. Id. at 562-63. See note 32 supra.
The fosr dissenters pointed out that the Lloyd Center was more like a business district than
Logan Valley, citing its larger size, the availability of professional services, and its private
police force with full police privileges from the city of Portland. Id. at 575.
38. Id. at 569-70. The Court noted that property does not "lose its private character
merely because the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes." Id. at 569.
The Court distinguished Marsh as a very different situation where a company had assumed
all of the attributes of a municipality as a delegate of the state. Id.
39. Id. at 564. For a discussion suggesting that the Court should have stayed with the
traditional first amendment test of interference with use instead of related to use, see Note,
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner: The Demise of Logan Valley and the Disguise of Marsh, 61 GEo. L.J.
1187, 1207-12 (1973).
40. 407 U.S. at 566-67. The Court noted the handbills could be conveniently distributed
to pedestrians and drivers from public sidewalks and streets around the mall. The Court
found: "It would be an unwarranted infringement of property rights to require them to
yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist. Such an accommodation would diminish property rights
without significantly enhancing the asserted right of free speech." Id. at 567. For discussion
criticizing the alternate forum standard see The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REv.
122, 130 (1972).
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establishments because the difference between shopping centers and single stores
41
was one of degree, not principle.
Shopping center owners' right to exclude expressive activity was strengthened by the Supreme Court decision in Hudgens v. NLRB.42 Union members
picketing a store located in an enclosed shopping mall 4a were threatened by the
mall owner's agent with arrest for trespass. 44 The union asserted the threat
violated their rights under the National Labor Relations Act. 45 The Court
seized-8 the opportunity to overrule Logan Valley' 7 and reject the "related to
use" test as unconstitutional, 48 finding that the test called for an impermissible
examination of the content of speech.' 9 The opinion acknowledged that the
first amendment provides no protection for expression on privately owned
property, and thus was inapplicable in the Hudgens setting.50 The Court dedared, however, that property rights could be limited by the legislatively
created rights of others.5 1 In Hudgens the conflict was between the owner's
constitutionally protected property rights and the union members' statutory
right to advertise their strike. 52 Remanding the case to the National Labor
Relations Board,5 3 the Court called for an accommodation of the conflicting
rights with as little destruction of either as possible. 54
41. 407 U.S. at 565-66. The Court pointed out that the private character of a free-standing
store was not lost by its being large or clustered with other stores in a shopping center. But
the majority noted that government regulation of a large and busy shopping facility might be
different because of a greater interest in public health and safety. Id. at 569-70.
42. 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976). See generally Comment, Constitutional Law: Freedom of
Speech: Property Rights Triumphant in the Shopping Center, 28 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 1032 (1976).
43. 424 U.S. at 509. The picketers were not employees of the retail store but employees of
the warehouse, located elsewhere. They were protesting the company's failure to agree to
demands made during contract negotiations. Id.
44. Id.

45. Id. at 509-10. The union members filed a complaint with the NLRB alleging the
threats were an unfair labor practice. The NLRB found for the union. Scott Hudgens, 205
N.L.R.B. 628, aff'd, 501 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974).
46. Id. at 518. Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, stated that the constitutional
issue did not need to be reached. He accused the Court of departing from tradition for bypassing the statutory question and overruling Logan. Id. at 526.
47. Id. at 518. The Court said: "Mhe ultimate holding in Lloyd amounted to a total
rejection of the holding in Logan Valley." Id.
48. Id. at 520-21.
49. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1974) (city ordinance struck
for examining content of expression in regulating drive-in movies); Police Dep't v. Moseley,
408 U.S. 92 (1972) (ordinance which forbade all picketing near a school except labor disputes
called for an unconstitutional examination of the content of speech).
50. 424 U.S. at 521. See generally Schauer, Hudgens v. NLRB and the Problem of State
Action in First Amendment Adjudication. 61 MINN. L. Rav. 433 (1977).
51. 424 U.S. at 521. For a discussion of the history behind the early labor and shopping
center cases see Gould, Union Organizational Rights and the Concept of "Quasi-Public"
Property,49 MwN. L. RV. 505 (1965).
52. 424 U.S. at 521. The union members' rights arise under 29 U.S.C. §157 (1976). The
statute provides that employees have a right to organize, form, and join labor organizations
and to engage in concerted activities to promote collective bargaining. Id.
53. 424 U.S. at 523.
54. Id. at 521.
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Nevertheless, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,55 when the federal government contended that the public had a federally legislated right of access to a
private marina,56 the Court did not accommodate the rights of the public and
the rights of the owners. Instead, the justices examined the attempted restriction on the owner's right to exclude to ascertain whether it amounted to a
taking without just compensation.57 The Court focused on the economic impact5 8s of the regulation and determined that removing the right to exclude
would unreasonably interfere with the owner's investment-backed expectations. 59 Finding the regulation would bring about a physical invasion of the
property, 60 the Court held the government would have to compensate the
owners if the right to exclude were taken.6 1
In the instant case, the Court acknowledged that the right to exclude others
is a protected property right 62 but stated the destruction of one part of the
"bundle of rights" does not necessarily amount to a taking.6 3 To determine
whether California had unconstitutionally taken the owner's property by prohibiting 4 him from excluding expressive activity in his shopping center, the
Court examined the character of the state's action, its economic impact, and
55. 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979).
56. Id. at 387-89. The government relied on the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act
of 1899 §10, 33 U.S.C. §403 (1976) to claim that as a navigable water the federal government
has control over the marina. 100 S. Ct. at 387.
57. Id. at 392. The government may not take an owner's property for public use without
justly compensating him. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
58. 100 S. Ct. at 390, citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978). The Court admitted there are no set requirements defining when an economic
injury requires a payment of just compensation. The important factors singled out were
economic impact, the extent of interference with investment-backed expectations, and the
character of the government's action. 100 S. Ct. at 390.
59. Id. at 393. The company had dredged a shallow pond to build the marina and connect
it with the bay. Id. at 386. The owners charged an annual fee of $72 to the customers. Id. at
393.
60. Id. The Court is more likely to find that a taking without just compensation has
occurred when a regulation causes a physical invasion of the property rather than economic
harm alone. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See, e.g.,
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (government planes invading airspace over private
property cause a taking which must be compensated). See generally F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES
& J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973); Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49
N.Y.L. REv. 165, 170-72 (1974); Sax, Taking and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 46-48 (1964).
61. 100 S. Ct. at 393. The Court said the government would have to exercise its power of
eminent domain if it wanted to require the owners to give up the right to exclude. Id. See
generally Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria,44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1970).
62. 100 S. Ct. at 2041. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 383, 393 (1979);
United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d 1383, 1394 (Ct. Cl. 1975); United States v.
Lutz, 295 F.2d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 1961).
63. 100 S. Ct. at 2041. See notes 13 & 15 supra.
64. Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d. 899, 910-11, 592 P.2d 341, 347, 153
Cal. Rptr. 854, 860-61 (1979). The California Supreme Court held that the California constitution granted a freedom of speech which could be exercised even in a privately owned
shopping center. By reversing the lower court's denial of injunctions prohibiting PruneYard
from excluding the students, the court denied the owner's right to exclude. Id.
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its interference with investment-backed expectations.6 5 The majority found no
indication of impending harm to the value of the property or the owner's ability
to use it.66 The character of the regulation was considered inoffensive to the
commercial purpose of the center because the state allowed the owner to adopt
time, place, and manner restrictions on those wishing to conduct expressive
activity on his property. 67 The majority declared that in the shopping center
context, the physical invasion6s resulting from the state-granted rights was not
a determinative factor.69 From these findings the Court concluded the state's

prohibition on exclusion did not amount to an unreasonable interference with
the shopping center property, and therefore was not a taking. 70
Distinguishing the instant decision from Kaiser Aetna v. United States, the

Court maintained that the marina owners' commercial purpose was to charge
those who used the marina and exclude the non-paying public7 1 If the marina

owners were forced to allow free access to the public, the members would no
longer have to pay and the marina owners would lose their investment-backed
expectations.72 On the other hand, the shopping center's ability to make a profit
did not depend on its right to exclude, but rather on its accessibility to shoppers. The Court found no indication that reasonable expressive activity would
harm the center's business.73 Kaiser Aetna's right to exclude was essential;74 the

shopping center's was not.75
The Court rejected the shopping center's contention that Lloyd prevented

the state from limiting the owner's constitutionally protected right to exclude.76
65. 100 S. Ct. at 2041. The Court stated the determination was to discover whether the
state's restriction forced the shopping center to bear a burden which should be borne by the
public. Id. The justices noted that the shopping center should not give up something more
or different than other members of the public. Id. at 4652 n.7. See also Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 428 U.S. 104, 123-25 (1978).
66. 100 S. Ct. at 2042.
67. Id. The California Supreme Court quoted Justice Mosk's dissenting opinion in
Diamond v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1974) (Diamond II),
which stated that the ability to regulate expression was a considerable factor in his opinion
which kept the owners' property rights from being significantly harmed. Id. at 345, 521 P.2d
at 470, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 478 (dissenting opinion).
68. See note 60 supra.
69. 100 S. Ct. at 2042.
70. The Court seemed to minimize the physical invasion because of the owner's right to
regulate. Id. See note 67 and accompanying text, supra.
The Court also dismissed PruneYard's argument that it had been denied its property
without due process of law. Quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), the Court
pointed out the due process clause only served as protection against unreasonable, arbitrary,
and capricious regulations. Id.
71. 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979).
72. 100 S. Ct. at 2042.
73. Id. Appellee offers the agrument that since all of the shopping centers in the state
will be affected, none will suffer a declining profit. Brief for Appellee at 35-36, PruneYard
Shopping Center, Inc. v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
74. Id. at 2042. See text accompanying notes 55-61 supra.
75.

Id.

76. Id. at 2040. The Court sanctioned a state's ability to create rights broader than those
conferred by the federal constitution. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (a state
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The justices implied, however, that in the absence of a state constitutional
provision or statute extending the first amendment rights, the Court would
apply the more restrictive analysis of Lloyd.77 The majority emphasized that
the state and federal governments could regulate an owner's use of his private
property78 as long as the regulation did not amount to a taking without just
compensation.9
By using the taking test s to determine the extent of shopping center
owner's property rights, the Court achieved a more consistent treatment of
property rights. Rather than balancing free speech and property rights, 81 the
Court concluded that if the regulation does not constitute a taking, the owner's
property rights have not been impermissibly infringed. 82 If the regulation is
too onerous, the government will have to pay the owner for a taking or refrain
from enforcing its regulation. 83 The juxtaposition of the taking analysis against

traditional first amendment balancing lends flexibility to cases in which speech
and property rights conflict. While state-authorized expressive activity might
not unreasonably interfere with a large shopping center, such interference at a
small store might harm its owner to the extent that a taking must be found.
The Court was able to protect property owners from unreasonable interference
by the state, while allowing the state to exercise its police power and enforce
any necessary regulations of private property.
The taking analysis allows states or the federal government a broader ability
with higher standards for search and seizure may apply its own harmless error rule when the
fourth amendment is not violated).
77. 100 S. Ct. at 2040. See text accompanying notes 35-41 supra.
Justice Marshall concurred separately because he contends that Lloyd and Hudgens were
decided wrongly. It is his belief that state action was present in those cases, as well as in
Logan Valley, because the shopping center owners replaced the traditional first amendment
forums, and the state allows them to use their trespass laws to exclude expression. Marshall
thinks that because of this state action the first amendment should apply. 100 S. Ct. at 2045
(concurring opinion). See Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 221.
78. 100 S.Ct. at 2040-41. The Court discussed the governments' right to regulate in terms
of its police power. Id.
The term police power is used by the courts to distinguish between regulations which may
be enforced without payment of just compensation and those which require payment. The
goal of police power regulations is traditionally to protect the health, safety, welfare and
morals of the community. Sax, supra note 60, at 36 n.6.
For a discussion which traces the notion of property through history and develops the
theory that property rights have never been beyond control, see Hecht, From Seisin to Sit-In:
Evolving Property Concepts. 44 B.U.L. REV.435 (1964).
79. 100 S. Ct. at 2041. See note 11 supra.
80. See note 58 supra.
81. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946). The Court stated: "When we
balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy
freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter
occupy a preferred position." Id.
82. 100 S.Ct. at 2041-42.
83. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 383, 393 (1979) (government must
either pay compensation or refrain from invoking regulation); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (regulation which prohibited coal mining to prevent subsidence
was a "taking" of coal company's property).
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to regulate access to private property than if the Lloyd decision had been interpreted as conferring an absolute property right.8 4 Since the point at which
a regulation becomes a taking has never been established, the Court avoided
defining an absolute right to enter or exclude. 5 The result under the taking
test was more credible than the pre-Lloyd notion that shopping centers were
public property while single stores were private property. a8
By adopting a taking analysis, the Court has found a way to protect private
property from state-authorized interference while concurrently allowing states
to grant a freedom of speech broader than that of the first amendment. 87
Furthermore, the Court has reopened the question of individuals' right to speak
in shopping centers by allowing states to give individuals a right of access to
private property which is open to the public for a particular use.88 Courts now
have a criterion by which to decide when expressive activity will be allowed on
private property. The taking analysis benefits individuals as well as store and
shopping center owners. If the shopping center owner would be harmed to the
extent of a taking, he will be protected. 9 If not, he needs no protection and the
public will benefit by regaining shopping centers as a forum.90
MARGARET

D. MATHEWS

84. In a case very similar to Lloyd, Lenrich Assoc. v. Heyda, 264 Or. 122, 504 P.2d 112
(1972), the Supreme Court of Oregon interpreted the Lloyd decision to have balanced the first
amendment rights of individuals against the property rights of the owners. The court then
held that although the freedom of speech granted by the Oregon constitution was broader
than the first amendment, Lloyd would control since there were no significant factual differences between the cases. Id. at 115-16. See generally Comment, Owners' Fifth Amendment
Property Rights Prevent a State Constitutionfrom ProvidingBroader Free Speech Rights than
Providedby the FirstAmendment, 86 HAnv. L. REv. 1592 (1973).
85. See note 58 supra.
86. Lloyd v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 565-66 (1972). See note 41 and accompanying text,
supra.
87. In his concurrence, Justice Marshall notes this aspect of the decision is: "part of a
very healthy trend of affording state constitutional provisions a more expansive interpretation
than this Court has given to the Federal Constitution." 100 S. Ct. at 2046 (concurring
opinion). See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977).
88. Other states may now interpret state constitutions to grant rights of access to shopping
centers. See note 84 supra.
89. The Court found the interference with PruneYard Shopping Center would not be too
great. The justices took into consideration the authority granted by the state to the center
to regulate the time, place and manner of expressive activity. 100 S. Ct. at 2042. See note 67
supra.
90. The value of shopping centers as a forum was noted by the dissent in Lloyd Corp.
v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) "For many persons who do not have easy access to television,
radio, the major newspapers, and the other forms of mass media, the only way they can express themselves to a broad range of citizens on issues of general public concern is to picket,
or to handbill, or to utilize other free or relatively inexpensive means of communication. The
only hope that these people have to be able to communicate effectively is to be permitted to
speak in those areas in which most of their fellow citizens can be found." Id. at 580-81.
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